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tEuthanasia' and Dying Well Enough•
Paul Ramsey
In o rder to t hink straight
about the question of the m o rality of "euthanasia," I want first
of all to convince you that:
1. It is better if you do not
know the Greek language, or the
root meaning of the word.
2. You do not need to learn
how to demonstr ate that, while
to kill som eone directly (or with
direct intention) is damnable,
you are excusable if you kill
someone only indirectly (or w ith
indirect voluntariety).
3. You do not need to deploy
SUbtleties like saying you are
accountable fo r another's d eath
if you were the active agent of it,
but not accountable if you were
/XIIsive while t he d eath occurred.
4. You do not need to prove
to the waiting world of philosoPhers or theologians that there is
a crucial moral distinction to be
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drawn between acts of omission
and acts of commission even
tho ugh the consequence is the
srune.
5 . You do not need to puzzle
fo r very long over the m eaning of
t he distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" medical means of saving life - the
fir st supposed to be morally
mandatory and the second supposed to be dispensable, both in
past Christian medical ethics and
in t h e views of m ost physicians.
These distinctions may be im:
por tant to take up in other connections - I happen to believe
som e are - but neither separately nor together do they serve to
solve or dissolve or even to clarify t h e question of euthanasia. In
particular, to frame t he question
in terms of omission and com mission, passive or active euthanasia, direct versus indirect killing, o rdinary versus extraordinary m eans - and even our wobbly use of the term "eu thanasia"
- only serve to confuse moral
discourse. Yet it seems nearly impossible to dislodge such language.
The title of this article is taken
from a recent study pamphlet
issued by t he General Synod
(Church of England) Board of
Social Respon s ibility.! "Man
should be enabled to 'die well,' "
is the t hem e of that pamphlet. It
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goes on to say: " This is the literal m eaning of the word 'euthanasia' and, if we were starting
afresh , there would be a good
case for using this word to express our common concern for
the welfare of the dying . But this
is no longer possible, since the
word has now become establish ed in popular usage with a
more precise m eaning."
That "more precise"- and corrupted - m eaning, I suggest, is
that human b eings should sometimes ch oose death as an end.
The choice of one 's own death as
an end is now t he meaning
p acked into the word " euthanasia." Therefore , it occurs to us,
when discussing the morality of
the matter , to attach certain
predicates that describe the manner and means to death as a
chosen and c hoice-worthy end.
· We speak of "active" or " passive " euthanasia, of " directly" or
"indirectly" disposing a patient
to death, of wheth er death came
by acts of omission or by acts of
commission , by action or by refraining.
I would get rid of all those
terms. We are misled to them by
o ur po pular and irreformable
usage of the word "euthanasia"
- for choosing death as an end.
Since we canno t restore the word
to its original meaning, I t hink
we simply must speak of the immorality of euthanasia and of t he
morality of " dying well" - or,
more soberly , of "dying well
enough ." That may be to beg the
qu estion, or at least to anticipate
a conclusion. But ther e is little
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wrong with that among re :lers
who are even now on the VI tch.
It is often . said . th at ceas g to
oppose d eath and letting c' are

" indirect euthanasia," wh ~ to
intervene, ' to start or hast the
dying process would be ' 1rect
euthanasia." It is importa that
we entirely reject this lru 1age,
the
and not solely because
subtle suggestio n freque1, :1 intr~duced th at an apolor ;:, for
the m orality of letting d if: only
a reluctant euthanasiast. '1e al·
ternatives are simply l ween
" dying we ll enough" (dec, itself
never chosen either as e· or as
means) and choosing de<i as an
end (and in that, he who 10oses
the end ch ooses the me<. also).
The language of direc 1direct
was . care fully honed
tradi·
tiona! moral analysis in fder to
sort right from wrong 1 quite
different kinds of dilerr. ' as than
the one we are now cm .dering.
That language is proper! used in
the case o f indirect th ·apeutic
abortion (where a phy cian re·
moves a cancerou s ,. erus in
order to save a w orn •1 's life,
knowing full well tha he also
kills the unborn chil< with~n}
and in th e case of coiL eral civil
damage in acts of wa targeted
upon legitimate militar) _tar~e:~
In t hose cases, direct an<.l mdlr .
intentionality o f di rect and m·
direct effects h ave to do Wl·th thets
t wofold (or manifold) effec
·
or
flowing from a single ac twn,
from a s ingle act of the wi_ll, :;~
geted upo n som e good whli~ t·
agent foresees (and so '' ind1rec

ly" wills or permits) some evil
side-effects.
The only instance in which
such language and its moral
meaning need be invoked in discussing the question of euthanasia is a minor one. It is also very
obscure how fac tually to analyze
what is being done in that instance. I refer to t he use of painrelieving drugs which are supposed also to be life-shortening.
That, indeed , is an instance in
which from a single volition and
action two effects are (ambiguously) foreseen to foll ow.
Clear Moral Analysis
The moral analysis is clear
enough. Any physician knows
whether he is trying to relieve
suffering or trying to bring on
death. His aim is the former
even if he knows that he is als~
doing the latter . No one doubts
that he should relieve pain and
SUffering, even if a shorter life
for the patient is an " indirect"
~ult of the medical care he
UUtiates.
. Once in an interdisciplinary
d~ussion a scientist friend of
~lne - a proponent of eu th ana111 on utilitarian grounds wh o
,
berleves we should comparatively
:u~~ hum~ li~es in t heir
chnmg tra]ectones, slowing
10111
e • hastening others .:.... was
~king fun at the "absurd " dis~ion between the direct and
:curect results of pain -relieving
lUgs. I asked him what h e
:UOUld think if we had drugs t o
dideve suffering that certainly
dea not shorten lives or hasten
th. He replied that he'd op-

pose funding the research to discover any such way to deal with
the suffering of the dying. My
rejoinder was, " Then you can tell
the difference between the direct
or intended and the indirect or
unintended of the twofold e ffects of medication!" As between the two, h e simply wanted
physicians som etimes to bring on
death , and inciden tally , of course,
relieve the suffering of the dying.
In the case of pain-relieving
drugs, the moral grounds for
approving their use even if d eath
comes sooner is clear enough,
and, I believe, convinc ing. As
stated in the Anglican p amphlet:
There is a clear disti nction to be
drawn be tween rendering someone
unconscious at the risk of kill ing
him and killing him in order to
render him unconscious . ... There .
is a dPcisive d iffere nce between t he
situatu.... , of a m edical practit ioner
who se pat ient d ies as the resul t of
an increased dosage of a p ai n-killing
drug and who wo uld use a safer
drug had it been availa bl e, and that
o f a publi c executi o ner, in s tates
whi ch employ this m ea ns of carry ing
o ut th e death pe na lty , wh o' c h ooses
drugs fo r the ir d eath -ind ucin g pro perties. Two rive rs may take t heir
rise at a ve ry li t tle distance from
o ne anoth er o n a moun ta in o us plateau , but thi s slig h t diffe rence may
determ ine t h at th e o n e fl ows north
and the oth er south . 2

.
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What is in doubt is t h e fac t ual
situation. To suffer unrelieved
pain is also debilitating and lifeshortening. " Giving t he right
drugs is n ot tantamount to killing the patient slowly . The relief
of pain itself may well lengthen
life: it will certainly enhance
it."3 "This is not 'protrac ted
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euthanasia' .. . as it has been
called, but a way of enabling
someone to live actively up to
the moment of death."4
My point, however, is to urge
that we jettison the expressions
"direct" and "indirect" from discussions of euthanasia unlesss it
is very clear that we are talking
about this single issue: the use of
pain-relieving drugs. Except for
this sort of medical decision, the
alternatives are choosing death as
an end and the means thereto
also (to add "deliberately" or
"directly" says no more than
a lready stated by the word
" choose") or to let die and to help
the dying to die well enough
(and that entails no choice of
death, direct or indirect, as end
or means).
The remaining verbal distinctions - the alleged difference between "passive" and "active
euthanasia, between acts of omission and acts of commission, between action and refraining
- can be taken together for comment. Again, those may be the
right-making or wrong-making
features in the analysis of some
moral questions, but not of the
treatment of terminal patients.
Of course, euthanasia is an active
choice of death as an end and of
the means thereto. Death is
brought about by commission,
by an action. For Jews and Christians - and for other religious
outlooks as well - euthanasia is
wrong because it is wrong to
choose death (to say " deliberately" or "directly" adds nothing).
But the alternative policy is
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not correctly characteriz
"passive" euthanasia (a J
choice of death as an en0
negative means). Death's (
not advanced by acts of m
or by refraining. Death's ·
advanced by the diseas
itself, which it is now m
fight.

l as
ssive
.r by
.lSe is
ssion
a se is
state
·ss to

It is rather another cs e that
alter·
is advanced by choosing
native course of action. hen .a
::> thing
doctor says, "There's
more to be done," he r· i nS, in
more
context, "There's noth
to be done to cure or t c .ve this
othing
particular life," not
more to be done " a: ,Iutely ,
except to switch to inal J n, pas·
sivity, omission, refrain , " Itis
, .Angli·
entirely misleading," t .
can pamphlet correct!:- affirms,
"to call decisions to c : .,e cura·
tive treatment negativ• uthana·
sia'; they are part of g 1d medi5
cine, and always h avr Jeen."
The switch from cun • ve treat·
ment is followed imm• tately by
an exceedingly active ;· ~actice of
medicine - "commll. · tOns" of
many sorts- in carir £· for the
dying. In words dra't':1. from a
Protestant hymn, fron: trying to
"rescue the perishing'' o ne turns
to "care for the dying. ' Not even
the "turn" from wh at was fo~
merly the indicated treatment JS
an inaction, much less t he care
and treatment to which one then
turns Still that turn is n ot a turn
towa;d death as a goal of human
actions No one chooses death as
end or. means. We choose ra~he~
to care for the still-living dyJOgf.
. " 0
That is "affirmative ac t wn
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the highest order. One refrains,
of course, from what was formerly the needed curative treatment,
but that is promptly replaced by
the now needed caring treatment. The latter policy is as
active as the former. Both serve
life and neither chooses death as
end or as means .
Hospice a 'Way-Station'
Cicely Saunders, M.D., is the
leader of the Hospice movement
in Great ·Britain. The word Hospice, used in place of Hospital or
Sunset Village, means a waystation for pilgrims. She once remarked:
"I am in the happy position of
not being able to carry out drastic
life-prolonging measures because we
iust do not have the facilities at St.
Joseph 's. Other people have made
the decision, at a prior stage, that
this is a patient for whom such pro·
Cedures are not suitable or right or
kind. This makes it very much
easier for us than for the staff of a
busy general ward. I think that it is
extremely important t hat the deci·
sion be made by a person who has
learned all h e can about the family,
about the patient himself, and
about the whole situat ion. The fur·
ther we go in having special means
~t _our disposal, the more important
It IS that we stop and think what we
are doing .... I have had much cor·
respondence with t he former chair·
lllan of the Euthanasia Society in
Great Britain, and I took him round
St. Joseph's after I had been work·
ing there some eighteen months. He
came away saying, " I didn't know
You could do it. If all patients died
IOIJiething like this, we could dis·
~and the Society." And he added,
I'd like to come and die in your
!o~e." I do not believe in tak ing a
. hberate step to end a patient's
hfe- but then, I do not get asked.
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If you relieve a patient's pain and if
you can make him feel like a
w anted p e rson , which he is, then
you are not going to be asked about
euthanasia .... I think that eutha·
nasia is an admission of defeat, and
a totally negative approach. One
shoul d be working to see that it is
not need ed. " 6

A r eporter asked Dr. Saunders
why, even for emergencies, they
did not have an " intensive care
unit" at St. Joseph 's or St. Elizabeth's. She replied, "Why, all we
have here is intensive care!" That
says better than I can why we
should resist calling the practice
of dying well enough by such
names as "passive" or "negative"
euthanasia, and why we should
never let ourselves be put in the
position of having to prove that
refraining is somehow better
than acting, and be less accountable if evil comes about only
through our omissions.

II

The immorality of choosing
death as an end is founded upon
our religious faith that life is a
gift. A gift is not given if it is not
received as a gift, no more than a
gift can be given out of anything
other than kindness or generosity
(to give out of flattery or duplicity or to curry favor is not a
gift). 7 To choose death as an end
is to throw the gift back in the
face of the giver; it would be to
defeat his gift-giving. That, I suppose, is the reason suicide and
murder were called " mortal
sins," deadly states of the soul as
surely as is despair over God or
despair in face of the forgiveness
of sin.
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So also, religious faith affirms
that life is a trust. And not to
accept life as a trust, to abandon
our trusteeship, evidences a denial that God is trustworthy, or
at least some doubt that He
knew what He was doing when
He called us by our own proper
names and trusted us with life.
We are stewards and not owners
of our lives.
Or again, if, as Christians, we
believe that d eath is the "last
enemy" that shall be destroyed,
then to choose death for its own
sake would be a desertion to the
enemy, and a kind of distrust in
the Lord of life and the Lord
over the death of death.
Many people today think it
odd to believe that illness unto
death or the gradual decay of our
mortal frames are signs that God
is calling his servant home. That
seems to make nature God.
"Vitalism" is the usual charge. I
suggest, to the contrary, that
such a view is no more an oddity
than to believe that the birth
of a child is God's gift of life
and a sign of hope . Both are,
to the seeing eye, biological
processes. Both are capable of
being ·~rationalized, " and as faith
recedes, humankind seizes dominion : babies made to order,
death by choice. To the eyes of
faith, however, God gives and
God takes away. And it is no
novel conclusion of religious
philosophy that God always
works through "seco ndary
causes." If that is true, then
some current assaults on " vitalism" or " physicalism" are liable
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(if successful) to run God ent ·ely
out of the world.
Medical~Moral Policy

What, then, does one c ) OSe
in a medical-moral policy f allowing to die o r refusal ' furnot
ther treatment- if that
indominion over human I
;ardstead of trusteeship or s t
ship, if that is not base· ) n a
• is a
fundamental de nial that
gift and a trust? What, th• does
one choose in a medic, noral
policy of "dying well en {h" if
he does not choose deat. s end
or means? No one has u we red
Prof.
this question better th
Arthur Dyck o f Harvarr niver·
sity. A person " d oes nc ·boose
ile dydeath but how to live
ing." Physicians d ecid· now a
dying,
patient should live wh
be-tubed or as com fc 1ble as
about
p.ossible. Such choi(
" how the last days of e dying
patient are to be spel ' Dyck
goes on to say, are "nr tifferent
in principle from the • >ices we
make throughout our ·!e S as to
how muc h we will rest o w hard
we will work, how lit • or hoW
much medical intervl tion we
will seek or toleratf' and the
like ."8 Or, I would dd, like
choosing orange or , pie juice
for breakfast, to sm ok or not to
smoke, or between the shore or
the mountains for a vat ation.
These are life-ch owes. TheY
are indeterminate d ec isions in
that it is difficult to say hoW we
make the m, or to justify one op·
ut·
tion rather than ano ther. B
none is a choice between life or
Linacre QuarterlY

death, or who shall live and who
shall die. Indeed, that choice is
no~ ou~ of our hands. The dying
patient 1s, of course, in a narrow
p~sage _no longer thinking of
gomg to the shore o r to the
mountains. His choices indeed
are limited . Still , his choice of
how to live while dying is a lifechoice; it need never be a choice
of death as end or means. One
compares a certain state or condition of dying with another, one
treatment with another, or treatment with no treatment. All such
decisions are consistent with
accepting life as a gift and a
trust. None seizes dominion over
h~man life and d eath. We may be
rnlStaken ; indeed, we may be bad
trustees and exercise our stewardship of God's gift of life
wrongfully. Still, worthy or unworthy, we r e main trustees
making choices among the good
of. and for life and do not lay
~hum to d om inion over human
hfe. As Dyck puts it, "choosing
~ow_ to live while dying " stand s
111 dtametrical contrast to actions
that
"h ave the Immediate
·
.
intention of ending life (one 's own or
ano~er's). " Only the latter " rePUdiates the m eaningfulness and
Worth of one's own life." Only
the latter " irrevocably severs any
or potential c ontact with
0
ers and shuts t hem out of
one's life. , 0 nly the latter usurps
dorn·11110
·
•
n or throws back the gift
: the face of the giver. Only the
tter chooses death as means or
' end. The former is a life-choice
one
'
&till arn~ng the choices of a life
received.
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III
There was a final point listed
at the beginning of t his article
namely, you do not need to puz~
zle for very long over the meaning of the distinction between
"ord mary
·
" an d " extraordinary"
means of saving life.
Past moralists used the term
"ordinary means" to save life as
an ethical category ; it meant imperative. They used the term
"extraordinary me ans" as a term
of m oral permission; it meant
electable or morally dispensable
means. Like all oth er offenseterms or terms of approval, these
terms are , as classifications incurably circular until filled ~ith
concrete or descriptive m eaning.
So , " f orgery " means wrongfully writing someone else's name

not si mply writing someon~
else's name. " Lying " means
wrongfully vocalizing an untruth
not singing "I die! I die!" if on~
is a Wagnerian opera singer.
" M urd er " means wrongful killing, not just any killing.· We still
have to ask, what sorts of cases
count as these wrongs?
A discussion of what constitute~ ordinary or extraordinary

me?Ical means is like debating
which cases of writing someone
else's name constitute forgery
wh~t killings are wrongful, o;
which words uttered, inconsistent with the mind's apprehension, are to coun t as lying. In all
these cases, we have to ask
" Wh at counts? What are the'
m orally rel evant features?, "
when we judge a specific situa-
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chose against disfigurement.
These were all life-choices; none,
a choice of death as end or means.

Right to Refuse Treatment

Still there was an imi rtant
nuance in tQ.e older langue that
may be lost in the fo _;oing
our
translations, especially
contemporary talk abot.. t patient's right to refuse tre nent.
The terms "ordinary /ext >rdinary ~' - however cumb ~ ome,
opaque and unilluminat i - di·
rected the attention o physicians, patients, famil y ·lergy·
men, and moralists to ' ectiue
tient's
considerations in the
condition and in the a amennedies
tarium of medicine's
which determined whet. r decisions to allow to die O • ,o cone were
tinue to try to save
morally right or wrong < ·isions.

Instead of the traditional language, still current among physicians, we should talk about (2) a
patient's right to refuse treatment. Indeed, this en tire language about ordinary and extraordinary means was developed
by past moralists specifically to
apply to conscious patients who
are certainly not in the " process
o(dying."9 So they spoke of not
leaving ·home and traveling great
distances to obtain life-saving
treatment, of a justified revulsion
to disfigurement, etc.
Why do I say that the meaning
of "ordinary /extraordinary" can
be reduced "almost" without remainder to these two components? Why some hesitation in
recommending that we drop the
traditional language? Certainly
not because of any doubt about

The · translation "a
ttient's
right to refuse treatn 1t" en·
thrones, to the contrar.. an arbitrary freedom. It ascrib to subjective decisions the •>wer to
make medical intervent ns right
or wrong. Choosing 0 1 refusing
treatment is submitted o voluntaristic determination In contrast to that, the distir .:tion between ordinary and e·, traordinary means was a way o' referr~n_g
to refusals that are simply sutcl·
dal and those that m &.i not be.
The search for the specific mean·
ing of imperative or electable
means of saving life (objectively
relative to a patient 's medi~al
condition or to his hu man ctr·
cumstance) excluded a patient's
right to choose death as end 0 ~ .
means. He chose to remain a
home, not to travel far away; he

Certainly no patient has a
right arbitrarily to refuse treatment with medical assistance.
Physicians, too, hav e consciences, and integrity in their
professional judgments. Therefore, I add that the search for objective grounds for describing a
treatment as ordinary or extraordinary (objective, even when rela~~e to · the patient's dying condition) had also the virtue of not
turning physicians into "animated tools" (if someone prefers
Aristotle's definition of a slave
over the words "technician" or'
"instrument") who simply assist
a _patient to attain anything he
WIShes. Instead, a patient's need
and real claims upon our care
were to be read off the human
and medical reality of his case,
not from his expressed wishes
alone. His freedom and dignity
do not encompass the right to do
wrong, a right to assault the value of his own life with medical
assistance. Treatments are not
electable because elected desirable because desired.
'

tion or action to fall under one
of these terms.
When we ask this question, I
suggest that the morally significant meaning of ordinary and extraordinary medical means can
be reduced almost without remainder to two components. I
further urge that the older language be abandoned, and that instead we should speak of (1) a
comparison of treatments that
are medically "indicated" and
expected to be helpful, and those
that are not medically indicated.
In the case of the dying, that includes in all cases, or in most or
many cases, a judgment that further curative treatment is no
longer indicated.
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the rightfulness of stoppil
ther curative treatments
case of the dyi.~g.
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. If there is a right to die (a
right to choose death as an end),
then that implies "as is normal
rights, a correlative duty on
e part of others to secure to
~e individual the exercise of his
~t."lO Not yet have we asthe right to die, the right
. choose death as an end (if that
~ the meaning of "a patient's
light to refuse treatment"), the
Iaine moral status as the right to

:th

::ned

life. If the claim were verified
that an individual has a right of
arbitrary self-determination in
the matter of life and death, then
if he chooses to live, there is a
duty upon others to protect his
life and, equally, if he chooses to
die there is a duty upon others to
assist his dying. I, therefore, fear
that the translation " a patient's
right to refuse treatment" moves
too far in the direction of subjective voluntarism and automated physicians. Having gone to
that state of affairs in the matter
of abortion, let us not do so as
we approach medical euthanasia.
After this excursus, return to
the first component meaning and
translation of "ordinary /extraordinary," namely, treatmen t indicated or no further curativ~
treatment indicated in the case
of the dying. We should now be
prepared to see that this wording
does not mislead. It rather directs
attention to the objective condition of the patient, and not to
the wishes of any of the parties
concerned - not even the previously expressed opinion (as reported) of Karen Ann Quinlan.
Treatment indicated or no further treatment indicated are not
such by anyone's stipulation.
Within whatever margin of error,
these are objective medical determinations. That means that disagr ee ment - for example, between physicians and the family
of a comatose patient - may be
real disagreements over an objective medical situation and about
what should be done in a particular case.
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At the same time , a comparison of treatments, or of treatment with no further curative
treatments, is objectively relativ~
to the patient's present condition - not to som e notion of
"standard medical care" in a
physician 's mind . A routinized
understanding of "ordinary /extraordinary" is th e "security
blanket of som e physicians who
nevertheless have been known to
call some ethicists " absolutists"!
In this article I have been concerned simply with the clarification of terms, to th e end that the
prohibition of euthanasia can be
more fully understood. This is a
firm principle or moral norm
that should govern medical care.
I myself have suggested that
there m ay be "exceptions" to
t he rule against hastening or
causing or . ch oosing death. 11 A
littl e flurry of debate once
~wirled around those exceptions.
1 do not now enter the lists to
defend them. My point has rather been a far m ore important
one, against the trend that is
clearly evident in contemporary
discussions to weaken the principle prohibiting choosing d~a~h.
Ldose language, I believe, 1s Its
source.
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After reviewing both traditional teaching and traditional Christian thinking on positive euthanasia, the author attempts to establish a Christian basis for positive euthanasia in highly selected
circumstances. The author and
editor publish this with the intention of inviting comment
rather than settling an issue.
Ms. Cahill is a member of the
religion department of Boston
College.

Linacre QuarterlY

Respe ct for the value of
Some of the moral uncertainty
human life and care for its preswhich surrounds our current perervation in a state of physical
ceptions of the relation of the
Well -being have traditionally
sick to the healthy (especially to
motivated the practice of medimembers of the health care procine in Western societies. Because
fessions) and to alternative
of the relatively recent but very
courses of treatment, might be
lapid advancement of medical
alleviated by careful reflection
technology, it has become comupon the meaning of "the sancmonplace to observe that the
tity of life" and its implications
Proper affirmation of that refor action. Difficult questions
8pect and the adequate fulfill about life and d eath ought to be
ment of that care are perplexing
considered in light of the totality
ethical issues. It is often no easy
of the human person to whom
matter for the physician to deterthis principle h as reference. Biollline how best to honor his oblilogical life is said to be "sacred"
gation "to render service to
because it is a fundamental conhUJnanity with full respect for
dition of human meaning. But
the dignity of man. " 1
physical existence is not an ab-
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